Chapter 4
God’s Universal Salvific Will and the Problem of the Unevangelized
If our soteriology forces us to say “Sorry—wrong place, wrong time,” then the soteriology has gone wrong.
Full-Length Edition
A Woman Nobody Remembers
Her name was Mei. She lived in a small village in southern China, sometime in the third century. The village sat at the base of two green hills, a day's walk from the nearest market town. Mei ground millet in the morning and carried water from the well. She married young, bore children, watched one of them die before he could walk. She buried her son in the red clay behind the house, and something inside her broke in a way that never fully healed.
She prayed to her ancestors and to the spirits of the hills. She believed in something larger than herself. On clear nights she looked up at the stars and felt, in some wordless way, that the world had been made by someone who cared about it. She did not know the word for this feeling. She only knew that it was real. She held it the way a child holds a parent's hand in the dark.
She loved her family. She was kind to her neighbors. She cared for her aging mother when the other daughters would not. She never stole. She never lied when it mattered. She was, by any honest measure, a good woman. Not perfect. Not a saint. But good.
And she never once heard the name of Jesus.
Not because she refused to listen. Not because she was wicked. Not because she lacked curiosity about the divine. She never heard the gospel because no one who knew the gospel ever came to her village. The closest Christian community was thousands of miles to the west. Geography decided that. History decided it. The missionaries would not arrive for another fifteen hundred years.
Mei died in her forties, probably of a fever we could cure today with a week of antibiotics. Her daughter held her hand. The village elder burned incense. Mei closed her eyes. She exhaled her last breath. And then what?
I want you to sit with that question before I try to answer it. The standard options on the table in Christian theology each give Mei a very different fate. Some say she is lost forever, because she never placed conscious faith in Christ. Some say she might be saved by responding to the light she had, though she never actually met Jesus. Some say God arranged things so that she received what she needed before she died, perhaps through a dream or a vision. Each answer sounds tidy. None of them feels right.
And Mei is not alone. Multiply her by tens of billions.1 James Beilby calls this the soteriological problem of evil, and once you see it, you cannot unsee it.2 Roughly half of every human generation that has ever lived died before reaching adulthood. Entire civilizations rose and fell without a single copy of the Scriptures reaching their borders. Today, despite two thousand years of missions, billions of people still live and die in places where the gospel is a foreign rumor. If God truly desires all people to be saved (1 Timothy 2:4), what has he done about the billions who never had the chance?
This chapter faces that question head-on. I believe the Dying Encounter Model is the best answer the church has. But before I build the case for it, I want to show why the alternatives fall short. And before I do even that, I want to make sure the problem is felt, not just stated.
Because the temptation in theology is always to turn a heartbreak into a category. We give the problem a label, slot it into a system, and move on. But Mei was not a category. She was a woman who buried a child and looked up at the stars. She deserves better than a clever formula. She deserves an answer that takes seriously both the love of God and the real limits of her life. That is what this chapter tries to give her.
The Shape of the Problem
Beilby frames the tension with three claims that most Christians hold at the same time:3
The Shape of the Problem
(1) God desires that all people have a real chance to be saved. (2) Responding to the gospel of Jesus Christ with explicit faith is necessary for salvation. (3) Some people die without ever having heard the gospel. Any two of these statements fit together. All three together create a crisis.
Take any pair and the world makes sense. If God wants all to be saved and explicit faith is required, then we simply expect that everyone hears the gospel before they die. If explicit faith is required and some die without hearing, then perhaps God does not truly desire the salvation of all. If God wants all saved and some never hear, then maybe explicit faith is not strictly necessary.
But most Christians want to hold all three. They believe God sincerely loves every person. They believe faith in Christ is the way of salvation. And they know, as a plain fact of history, that billions have died without hearing. The tension is real, and it will not go away by pretending one of the three claims does not matter.
Beilby gives the tension human faces. I want to slow down and meet them, because the problem of the unevangelized is not an abstract puzzle. It is about people.
George
George is Beilby's name for the unevangelized adult. He lives in pre-Christian Mongolia, in the ninth century before Christ. He looks up at the stars one night, feels the pull of the Creator in his chest, and worships as best he knows how. He lives his entire life without meeting anyone who can tell him the name of Jesus. He dies in old age.4 The question: Is George lost? He never rejected the gospel. He never even had the option.
Anna
Anna is the infant who dies at six months. She never spoke a sentence, let alone prayed a prayer. She never sinned by personal choice. She never understood what sin was. The word infant appears nearly a thousand times in Scripture, yet as Beilby notes, not a single text directly addresses the eternal destiny of babies who die.5 The age-of-accountability argument is widely held but nowhere stated in the Bible. Anna introduces herself later in this book (see Chapter 30); for now, her presence reminds us that the problem is not only about geography. It is also about time. She did not have enough of it.
Sam
Sam is the profoundly cognitively disabled adult. He has lived his entire life unable to grasp the concepts that theologians consider essential to salvation: sin, grace, repentance, faith. He is loved by his family. He has never personally chosen evil. As Beilby points out, we tend to lump Sam together with Anna, but the cases are different.6 Anna may grow into full capacity in eternity. Sam raises the deeper question: Does salvation require the ability to understand propositions, or can a person enter a relationship with God through channels that bypass propositional knowledge? (Sam returns in Chapter 31.)
And then there are the harder figures.
Kunta Kinte
Kunta Kinte, from Alex Haley's Roots, stands for every person who heard "the gospel" from someone whose life was a living contradiction of it. Kunta was captured in Gambia at seventeen, shipped to America, and told about Jesus by the very men who enslaved him. The God his captors described blessed the rape and torture of Africans. Kunta rejected that God. And every honest Christian should agree that his rejection was morally right.7 He heard the name of Jesus. He did not hear the gospel.
Micha
Micha was born in South Korea and adopted by an American couple who divorced. Her foster father sexually abused her. When she told her foster mother, the woman accused Micha of seducing her husband. In high school, she found a youth pastor she trusted. He abused her too, and then used the Bible to justify it. After that, Micha refused to trust anyone. She could not bring herself to believe in a loving God, because every person who claimed to represent him had betrayed her.8 Did Micha hear the gospel? In a technical sense, yes. In every sense that matters, no. Her ability to trust had been destroyed by the people who were supposed to embody it.
Rapunzel
Rapunzel is Beilby's hardest test case. She heard the gospel. She was moving toward faith. Her identical twin, Gretel, committed her life to Christ at a church event one evening. Rapunzel was on her way to the same event when she was killed in a car crash.9 She was not unevangelized. She was not pseudoevangelized. She simply ran out of time. If she had survived another hour, she might have said yes to Jesus alongside her sister. Instead, she died on the highway.
Now picture all six of them standing before God on judgment day. And picture God saying to each of them: "I'm sorry. Wrong place. A distortion. Out of time." If our soteriology forces that answer, I believe the soteriology has gone wrong.
The First Answer: Restrictivism
Restrictivism says that explicit faith in Jesus Christ during this life is necessary for salvation. Those who die without hearing and believing are lost.10
The position is not a straw man. It has real strengths. It takes John 14:6 at face value: "No one comes to the Father except through me." It takes Acts 4:12 seriously: "There is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved." It does not water down the cross or make the Great Commission optional. If everyone will be reached some other way, why did Jesus command his followers to go to the ends of the earth?
I respect those commitments. The book you are reading shares them. Christ alone saves. The cross is not optional. The gospel must be preached.
But restrictivism has a devastating weakness. It makes eternal destiny a lottery of birthplace.
Common Objection: The Lottery of Birth
If salvation requires hearing the gospel in this life, then whether you go to heaven or hell depends largely on where and when you were born. Dale Moody asked the question plainly: What kind of God gives enough knowledge to damn a person but not enough to save them?11 The restrictivist has no good answer.
Stephen Jonathan identifies three varieties of restrictivism, each with its own flavor of discomfort.12 Hard restrictivism says God does not reveal himself in saving ways except through missionary proclamation. No missions, no salvation. Pessimistic agnosticism admits the question is hard and leaves the unevangelized in God's hands, but holds little hope for them. Optimistic agnosticism sees hopeful hints in Scripture but refuses to build on them. As J. I. Packer put it, the Christian should assume that no one will be saved apart from faith in Christ, and act accordingly.13
I think optimistic agnosticism is the most honest form of restrictivism. It refuses to claim more than it knows. But honesty about the limits of our knowledge does not solve the theological problem. The problem is not what we know. It is what God does.
The Calvinist has a reply. Deny the first premise. God does not desire all to be saved. He has chosen a particular people, the elect, and his saving will extends only to them. This position has the virtue of internal consistency. But it purchases consistency at a terrible price. It requires reading 1 Timothy 2:4 and 2 Peter 3:9 against their plain sense.14 And it requires the claim that the early church got Paul and Peter wrong for centuries. I find that too high a cost.
The Arminian has a different reply. God sincerely desires all to be saved, but human freedom frustrates the process. Evangelism is the God-ordained means, and when it fails to reach people, the failure is ours, not God's. This is closer to the truth. The Great Commission is a real command, and the church's failure to obey it carries real consequences. But the Arminian reply still does not account for the unevangelized themselves.15 Whatever the church's failure, the individual in pre-Christian Mongolia bears no responsibility for it.
Restrictivism also creates an impossible situation with Anna and Sam. If explicit faith is required, then infants who die cannot meet the requirement. Neither can the profoundly cognitively disabled. Most restrictivists quietly assume that God makes an exception for these cases. But a quiet exception is an admission that the rule does not hold.16 John Sanders pressed this point sharply. If the age-of-accountability principle is true for Anna, then we are saying that those who die in infancy in unevangelized countries are saved, while those unfortunate enough to survive into adulthood are damned.17 If the principle applies at all, it applies everywhere or nowhere.
And then there is the plain reading of 1 Timothy 2:4 and 2 Peter 3:9. God "desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth." God is "not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come to repentance." Restrictivism does not deny these verses. But it hollows them out. It turns God's universal desire into a wish that God himself declines to fulfill for most of the human race.18 The God who said "I have loved you with an everlasting love" (Jeremiah 31:3) is not a God whose love expires at a geographic boundary.
The Second Answer: Conservative Inclusivism
Inclusivism agrees that Christ is the only Savior. It disagrees that explicit knowledge of Christ is always required. On this view, a person who responds to the light God gives, even without hearing the gospel, may be saved by Christ's merits. Karl Rahner called such people "anonymous Christians."19 The Second Vatican Council taught that those who sincerely seek God and try to do his will can attain salvation, even without formal membership in the church.20 Clark Pinnock developed what he called the "faith principle": that what God requires is not the right theological formula but the right orientation of the heart toward God.21 John Sanders argued along similar lines. C. S. Lewis imagined the possibility in The Last Battle, where the Calormene soldier Emeth discovers that his lifelong service to Tash was, in fact, service to Aslan, because every true thing belongs to Aslan.22
I am not unsympathetic to this view. It affirms that God's love is not bounded by geography. It draws on Romans 1, where Paul argues that God has revealed himself to all people through creation. It takes seriously the fact that the Spirit works wherever the Spirit wills, not only where missionaries have gone.
What Inclusivism Gets Right and Gets Wrong
Inclusivism is right that God is at work in every human life, not only in the lives of the evangelized. It is right that the Spirit is not confined to the church's reach. But it solves the problem of the unevangelized by removing the one thing salvation most needs: an actual meeting with the actual Jesus. If Mei can be saved without ever knowing who saved her, then salvation becomes a category rather than a relationship.
But inclusivism has five serious weaknesses. I want to take each one seriously, because I think the cumulative weight is heavy.
First, it is patronizing. To call someone a "Christian" who has never heard of Christ, and who might vigorously object to the label, respects neither the person nor the faith.23 A devout Hindu does not want to be told she has been a Christian all along. A faithful Muslim does not want his lifelong devotion reinterpreted as a veiled form of something he explicitly rejects. The very people inclusivism claims to honor would often feel dishonored by it.
Second, it strains Romans 10:14–17. Paul asks, "How can they believe in the one of whom they have not heard? And how can they hear without someone preaching to them?" He concludes: "Faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ." Paul anchors saving faith in the preached gospel, not in a general religious orientation.24 If general revelation were enough, Paul's chain collapses. Why send missionaries at all?
Third, "content-free faith" dissolves into sincerity. If faith does not need to have Christ as its object, then what distinguishes saving faith from mere religious earnestness? Beilby is right: an implicit openness to God, however real, is irrelevant if it does not result in an actual relationship with the actual God.25
Fourth, it has nothing distinctive to say about Anna and Sam. If explicit faith is not required, then the infant and the cognitively disabled are saved automatically. But Beilby asks the better question: Would God not want to give even Anna and Sam the chance to stand before him and respond? Would not the God who values relationship want a real meeting, not a blanket category?26
Fifth, and most important for this book, inclusivism provides no mechanism. It says the unevangelized can be saved. It does not say how. There is no conscious encounter. No actual meeting with Jesus. No relationship freely entered. Salvation becomes something that happens to a person, not something a person does with God. That is salvation by sorting, not by communion.27
Beilby puts it best. An engaged couple is genuinely in love. She is committed to him, he to her. Does any of that mean they are married? No. All of the steps leading to the wedding are important. But none of them is the wedding itself. Inclusivism gives us the engagement but skips the ceremony. And inclusivism struggles badly with the pseudoevangelized. Kunta Kinte rightly rejected the "gospel" he heard. An inclusivist who values other religions might try to say that Kunta's Muslim devotion counts as implicit faith. But that is a stretch no orthodox inclusivist should want to make. And Micha's case is worse still. Her experiences have left her without faith of any kind. Inclusivism has nothing to offer her.28
I can hold a modest inclusivism alongside the Dying Encounter Model. God is at work everywhere, through general revelation, through the Spirit, through conscience and beauty and suffering. That work matters. But it is preparatory, not final. The final moment comes when the person meets Jesus face to face. And for the unevangelized, that meeting happens at the threshold of dying.
The Third Answer: Universal Opportunity Before Death
A third approach says that God ensures everyone hears the gospel before they die, by ordinary or extraordinary means. Some versions point to dreams, visions, or angelic messengers sent to unreached peoples. Others appeal to Molinism and the doctrine of middle knowledge.29
The dream-and-vision approach is attractive, and I do not doubt that God can and does use dreams. Reports of Muslims coming to faith through dreams of Jesus are well documented.30 But as a universal mechanism, it faces a hard question: Is it reasonable to believe that every person who lived before Christ, and outside the reach of Israel, received a clear saving vision from God? If so, we would expect to find powerful evidence of such encounters in the cultures involved. We do not.31 And even granting the dream theory for George, it does nothing for Anna and Sam. Infants do not process dreams. The profoundly cognitively disabled may not process them either.
There is a deeper issue with the dream theory. Even where God does use dreams, a dream is not the same as a face-to-face encounter with the risen Christ. A dream may point toward God. It may open a heart. But saving faith, as the New Testament describes it, is a response to a person, not a response to a symbol. The early church did not preach symbols. It preached the risen Jesus. If the dream does the work of the gospel, then the dream must deliver the content of the gospel, and at that point, the dream is doing something very close to what this book calls the encounter. The difference is only timing.
The more sophisticated version appeals to middle knowledge. William Lane Craig has argued that God, through his knowledge of what every free creature would do in every possible circumstance, arranged the world so that those who would have accepted the gospel if they had heard it are placed where they do hear it. Those who never hear, on this view, are those who would not have accepted the gospel anyway.32
This is a philosophically impressive move. But it has a fatal flaw. Beilby states it plainly: a hypothetical opportunity is not an actual one. It is far better that a person's eternal destiny turn on a choice they actually and consciously make, not on a choice God knows they would have made in circumstances that never occurred.33 His Medal of Honor illustration drives the point home. Imagine receiving the Medal of Honor not for something you did but for something God knows you would have done if you had been placed in a certain battle. Would you feel you earned it? Your eternal destiny deserves to rest on a real choice, not a hypothetical one.
There is another problem with Craig's approach that often goes unnoticed. It assumes that a person's response to the gospel is fixed across all possible circumstances. But we know from experience that this is not true. The same person who rejects a cold presentation of the gospel from a stranger may weep with joy when a trusted friend shares the same message years later. Context matters. Relationship matters. Timing matters. A person's "yes" or "no" is not a static property of their soul. It depends, in part, on how and when and by whom the question is asked. That is one reason the encounter must be personal, not hypothetical.
And again, middle knowledge as a pre-death sorting mechanism does nothing for Anna and Sam. An infant has no counterfactual set of free choices for God to consult. Neither does the profoundly disabled adult.
There is one more thing to say about middle knowledge here, and then I will leave the full treatment for later in the book. If Molinism is true, several thinkers have argued that it pushes toward universal reconciliation, not away from it. Jason Marsh pressed the point: an infinitely resourceful God could, in principle, create only those souls who would freely accept him in some feasible world. Andrew Hronich developed the idea further, coining the term transworld sanctity to describe the possibility that no one is constant in refusal across all possible worlds.34 The tension between Molinism and anti-universalism is real. R. Zachary Manis, who is no universalist, has argued that "anti-universalists are best served to reject Molinism altogether."35 At minimum, middle knowledge does not support the restrictivist case. And it leaves the door wide open for the kind of moment-of-death encounter this book proposes. (For the full treatment of middle knowledge, optimal grace, and their connection to the encounter, see Chapter 28.)
The Hard Cases
The rival answers are not all wrong. Each sees something true. Restrictivism is right that Christ alone saves. Inclusivism is right that God is at work outside the church's reach. The universal-opportunity view is right that God would not leave anyone without a chance. The problem is that none of them holds all the pieces together.
The hard cases show why. Let me take them one at a time and ask what the Dying Encounter Model does with each.
Infants: Anna Meets Her Maker
Anna died at six months. On the Dying Encounter Model, Anna does not remain an infant before God. In the encounter at the threshold of dying, the soul is freed from the limits of its earthly body. Anna is given whatever maturity and understanding the encounter requires. She stands before Jesus not as a baby but as a fully conscious person, seeing him clearly, responding freely.36
This is not a strange idea. Christians already assume something like it for elderly believers who die with dementia. No one imagines that Grandpa will stand before Jesus in the confused state of his final months. We assume his faculties will be restored. The same assumption applies to Anna. Beilby puts it this way: if Anna's relationship with God in heaven requires a level of understanding she never developed in this life, then it is reasonable to believe that the encounter includes the development of her capacities.37
Some readers will object: If Anna is practically certain to say yes, why bother with an encounter at all? Because salvation is not a rubber stamp. It is a relationship. And relationships require a meeting.38 (For the full development of infant salvation and the encounter, see Chapter 30.)
The Cognitively Disabled: Sam Is Met
Sam has lived his entire life unable to understand the gospel in propositional terms. But Beilby makes an important distinction. Relationship does not require the same cognitive level as grasping propositions. Some people with severe cognitive disabilities model virtues like kindness, trust, and faithfulness more naturally than the rest of us.39 The question is not whether Sam can pass a theology exam. It is whether Sam can be met by Jesus. And the answer, I believe, is yes.
In the encounter, Sam is freed from the limits of an injured brain. Whatever prevented him from understanding in this life is removed. He meets God as himself, whole and clear. Does every aspect of Sam's "disability" vanish? Not necessarily. What will be eliminated is our tendency to view people in terms of their abilities and disabilities. In the encounter, Sam is not "cognitively disabled." He is just Sam.40 (Sam returns in Chapter 31.)
Whole Civilizations: Mei and the Billions
Mei was one woman. But her situation was the norm for most of human history, not the exception. Before the first century, no one outside Palestine and its near neighbors had any access to the story of Israel's God. After the first century, the gospel spread, but slowly and unevenly. The great civilizations of East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, the Pacific Islands, and the pre-Columbian Americas rose and fell across thousands of years without the gospel reaching their borders. Every person born in those civilizations died without the chance to respond to Christ. Not a handful. Not a minority. Tens of billions.
Think about what that means. The Shang Dynasty lasted six hundred years. The Maurya Empire in India covered most of a subcontinent. The Mayan civilization produced one of the most advanced cultures in the ancient world. In none of these places, during all those centuries, did anyone hear the name of Jesus. The gospel was not refused. It was not available.
Note: The Scale of the Problem
Entire civilizations rose and fell without the gospel reaching their borders. The question is not merely whether a few individuals missed the message. The question is whether God loves the billions whose only "fault" was being born in the wrong century or on the wrong continent. The Dying Encounter Model says yes — and that his love did not stop at their last breath.
The Dying Encounter Model reaches what missions could not. Not because missions are unimportant. They are commanded, and they matter enormously for the quality of a person's life before death. But missions have limits. They arrive too late. They never arrive at all. They arrive distorted. For the billions already dead, the missionary question is moot. They lived. They died. No one came.
The encounter answers this. Every person, in every century, in every village, meets Christ at the threshold of dying. The encounter does not replace missions; it completes what missions could never finish. It is the safety net under the Great Commission, not its replacement.41 (The full treatment of the unevangelized and the encounter is in Chapter 32.)
The Pseudoevangelized: When "Hearing" Was Not Hearing
Beilby coined the term pseudoevangelized for people like Kunta Kinte, Micha, and Rapunzel.42 They heard a version of the gospel. But what they heard was so distorted, or received under such damaging conditions, that calling it "hearing" abuses the word.
Insight: The Pseudoevangelized
The traditional approach limits the postmortem encounter to those who never heard the gospel at all. But Beilby pushes further: What about those who heard a gospel so distorted that rejecting it was the morally right thing to do? Kunta Kinte rejected a "Christ" who blessed slavery. Micha rejected a "God" whose representatives abused her. To call their rejection a final spiritual verdict is to confuse the word "heard" with something it does not mean.
I want to press this point further, because I think it matters for more people than we usually admit. Even an accurate gospel can be distorted in reception by trauma, culture, or timing. A child raised in an abusive home may hear perfectly orthodox words about God the Father and recoil from every one of them, not because the words are wrong, but because the word "father" has been poisoned. A teenager rejected by the church for asking honest questions may come to associate Christianity with cruelty.
God can tell the difference between genuine rejection of the real Christ and a "rejection" that was the predictable fruit of factors beyond honest understanding. Beilby makes this distinction carefully. If the gospel is God's good news of salvation through Jesus Christ, then what is required is not some bare minimum auditory "hearing." It is a hearing that leads to genuine understanding. Can anyone seriously claim that Kunta Kinte had a real chance to respond to the good news in this life?43
Micha's case runs even deeper. Her experiences did not merely distort the gospel. They disabled her capacity to trust. There is a real parallel to Sam's case. Sam cannot understand the gospel because of a cognitive disability he did not choose. Micha cannot receive the gospel because of a trust disability inflicted on her by others. Would a God who leaves the ninety-nine sheep to seek the one lost sheep not want to give Micha a chance to respond without the weight of her abuse pressing down on every word?44
This is what the encounter does for the pseudoevangelized. It gives them a first real chance. Their premortem hearing was not genuine hearing, and God knows it. Beilby claims no knowledge of who has or has not actually heard the gospel in this life. What he claims is that God knows, and that God will provide a real opportunity to those who did not receive one.45
Note: Not a Second Chance
The encounter at the moment of death is not a "second chance" for anyone. For the truly unevangelized (George, Anna, Sam), it is their first chance. For the pseudoevangelized (Kunta Kinte, Micha, Rapunzel), it is their first real chance. The term "second chance" assumes that the first opportunity was genuine. For the pseudoevangelized, it was not.
Why the Dying Encounter Model Holds Together
I want to state the case plainly. The Dying Encounter Model is not a fourth option on the same level as restrictivism, inclusivism, and universal opportunity. It is the answer that takes what is right in each of them and holds it together without the weaknesses.
It does this in three ways.
Key Argument: Three Reasons the Model Holds Together
First, it preserves the necessity of explicit, conscious faith in Christ. It does not weaken John 14:6 or Acts 4:12. There is no other name. No other Savior. The Dying Encounter Model does not soften the exclusivity of Christ; it relocates the moment of faith, for the unevangelized, to the moment of death.
Second, it preserves the universal salvific will. 1 Timothy 2:4 and 2 Peter 3:9 mean exactly what they say. God desires all people to be saved. Not "all kinds of people." All people. And the encounter is the mechanism that turns that desire into a real offer for every soul that has ever lived.
Third, it provides what the other models lack: an actual mechanism. Not a category. Not a hypothesis. Not a blanket exception. A real meeting between a real person and the real Christ.
Preserving the Necessity of Explicit Faith
The Dying Encounter Model is not inclusivism. It does not say that general revelation is enough. It does not say that sincerity saves. It says that every person, at the moment of death, encounters the risen Christ and is given a full, conscious, informed opportunity to respond in faith. The encounter provides the explicit knowledge that inclusivism lacks. In the encounter, Mei does not respond to a vague sense of the divine. She sees Jesus. She hears the gospel. She understands who he is and what he has done. And she responds freely.46
This means the Great Commission is not undercut. Missions still matter. A person who hears the gospel in this life and follows Christ in this life has a richer, deeper relationship with God during their earthly years. The knowledge of Christ shapes how you parent your children, how you treat your neighbors, how you face suffering, how you spend your money. A person who knows Jesus for forty years has forty years of walking with him that the person who meets him at death does not. That is a real and precious loss. The encounter at death is not a replacement for evangelism; it is the provision God makes for those whom evangelism has not yet reached. The church should preach with all the urgency it can summon. But it should stop pretending that the eternal destiny of the unreached depends entirely on the church's speed.
Preserving the Universal Salvific Will
In Chapter 2, we saw that God's character is the foundation of everything this book argues. A God who is love (1 John 4:8) does not merely do love on occasion. Love is not something God turns on and off. It is who he is.
The universal salvific will is the expression of that love in the arena of salvation. God "desires all people to be saved" (1 Timothy 2:4). He is "not wanting anyone to perish" (2 Peter 3:9). These are not polite wishes. They are statements about the character of God himself.47 Thomas Talbott argues that a love which arbitrarily expires, which gives up on a soul because the clock ran out, is not the love the Bible describes.48 I think he is right about that, even though I am not sure he is right about everything else. (For the full engagement with Talbott, see Chapter 25.)
The encounter takes the universal salvific will seriously. It says God's desire to save reaches every soul, not in theory but in practice. The love that created Mei did not stop loving her when she exhaled. It met her on the other side of that breath.
Providing an Actual Mechanism
Here is where the Dying Encounter Model does something none of the alternatives can do. It gives us a how.
Restrictivism says some are lost. Inclusivism says some may be saved, through channels that remain vague. The universal-opportunity view says God arranges things, through providence or dreams or counterfactuals. But the Dying Encounter Model says this is how it works: the dying person, at the threshold between life and death, encounters the risen Christ. The soul, freed from the limits of the failing body, sees him clearly. The encounter is subjectively extended by the time-dilation that near-death experience research has documented.49 It may feel like weeks or months of patient persuasion. And in that encounter, the person responds freely.
This is not speculation built on nothing. It is an inference from converging lines of evidence. The NDE research gives us the subjective time-dilation: people in cardiac arrest report experiences that seem to last hours or even longer. The philosophy of time gives us the framework for how subjective and objective time can diverge (see Chapters 13 and 14). The theology of God's character gives us the motivation: a God who loves every soul would provide every soul a real chance. The veridical NDE cases give us evidence that consciousness persists during clinical death (see Chapter 8). And Ladislaus Boros gave us the philosophical template sixty years ago (see Chapter 16).
The mechanism is not magic. It is the intersection of a loving God, a conscious soul, and the strange elasticity of time at the edge of dying. Each of these elements is supported by evidence. Together they form a coherent picture. And that picture does something the alternatives cannot do. It turns God's universal desire to save into a universal offer, delivered personally, to every soul that has ever lived.
Go back to the six faces we met at the start of this chapter and ask what each model gives them. Restrictivism gives George, Anna, Sam, Kunta Kinte, Micha, and Rapunzel nothing but an apology. Inclusivism gives them a category but no encounter. The universal-opportunity view gives them a hypothetical choice but no actual one. The Dying Encounter Model gives each of them a meeting. George meets the God he worshiped under the stars. Anna meets Jesus with a mind finally able to understand him. Sam meets the Savior with a soul no longer confined by an injured brain. Kunta Kinte meets the true Christ, not the slaver's counterfeit. Micha meets a love that does not betray. And Rapunzel finishes the conversation that was cut short on the highway. That is not a theory. That is an answer.
A God Who Does Not Offer Grace Generically
One more thing must be said before we close. A God like the one this chapter describes would not offer grace in some generic, one-size-fits-all way. He would know each soul. He would know what would reach Mei and what would reach Kunta Kinte and what would reach Micha. Jerry Walls gives this idea its name: optimal grace. Not merely sufficient grace, but the best possible appeal God can make to each particular heart, calibrated to reach that person without overriding their freedom.50
Think of the difference between a gospel tract left on a park bench and a letter written by the person who knows you best in the world. The tract is impersonal. It says the same thing to everyone. The letter speaks to your particular fears, your particular wounds, your particular longings. Both contain the same core message. But the letter is far more likely to reach you, because the person who wrote it knows where your defenses are and where your heart is open. Optimal grace is the letter, not the tract. It is God addressing each soul in the way that is most likely to win a free "yes."
Walls first defined the concept in Hell: The Logic of Damnation and restated it two decades later in Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation.51 It is the natural companion to everything this chapter has argued. If the encounter at the moment of death is real, then it is not a mass event. It is a personal meeting. And a personal meeting with a God who knows every heart would be, by definition, optimally calibrated. (For the full development of optimal grace, middle knowledge, and the encounter they produce together, see Chapter 28.)
Back to Mei
I began this chapter with a woman nobody remembers, grinding millet in a third-century Chinese village. Let me return to her now.
Restrictivism seals Mei's fate by latitude and longitude. She was born too far from Jerusalem and too early for the missionaries. That is all. On this view, the most important fact about Mei is not her character, not her prayers, not her kindness. It is her address.
Inclusivism makes Mei a Christian without her consent and without an encounter. She is saved by category. But she never meets Jesus. She never hears the gospel. She never makes a choice. She enters eternity without knowing who carried her there.
The universal-opportunity view rests Mei's destiny on a choice she never actually made. God knows what she would have done if she had heard. But she did not hear. And a hypothetical yes is not a real one.
The Dying Encounter Model says something different. It says that the real Mei, at the threshold of dying, meets the One who loved her into existence. She sees him. She hears his voice. She knows, for the first time, who the Creator of the hills and the rivers truly is. And she responds, freely, knowingly, finally. Whatever she decides, it will be just. Because the God who met her is just, and the encounter he gave her was real.52
I cannot tell you what Mei decided. That is between her and Jesus. But I can tell you this: she was not abandoned. She was not forgotten. She was not consigned to darkness because a missionary arrived fifteen centuries too late. She was met. And that is the heart of everything this book argues.
The same is true for George, standing under the stars in pre-Christian Mongolia. The same is true for Anna, who never drew breath long enough to hear a sermon. The same is true for Sam, whose injured brain could not process the words. The same is true for Kunta Kinte, who rightly refused a gospel that smelled of chains. The same is true for Micha, whose trust was broken by the very people who claimed to carry the truth. And the same is true for Rapunzel, who ran out of time on a highway one hour before her life might have changed. None of them is abandoned. All of them are met.
The first four chapters of this book have laid the foundation. We have looked at God's character (Chapter 2), the universal scope of the atonement (Chapter 3), and the problem of the unevangelized (this chapter). Every beam supports the same weight: God loves every soul, Christ died for every soul, and the encounter at the moment of death is how that love and that death reach the ones whom human history left behind.
Now the book turns to the framework itself. Chapter 5 asks a question we have been assuming we can answer: What, exactly, is the moment of death?
Notes
↑ 1. Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson, World Christian Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Beilby draws on these estimates throughout; see Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 3–5.
↑ 2. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 15–18. Beilby explicitly frames the destiny of the unevangelized as a “soteriological problem of evil” parallel to the classic problem of evil in philosophy of religion.
↑ 3. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 16–17. The three-part framework is Beilby’s central analytic tool for mapping the positions.
↑ 4. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, p. 4. George is Beilby’s name for the unevangelized adult who lives in pre-Christian Mongolia. He returns throughout Beilby’s analysis as the baseline case.
↑ 5. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 5–7. Beilby surveys the age-of-accountability tradition, infant baptism, and Calvinist election as proposed solutions, and finds none of them biblically decisive.
↑ 6. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 9–11. The range of cognitive disabilities is far wider than the range of developmental stages in infancy, and some cognitively disabled persons exhibit striking spiritual sensitivity.
↑ 7. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 11–12. Beilby observes that all Christians should agree with Kunta’s assessment of this “gospel” and should regard his rejection of it as “not only eminently rational, but even morally praiseworthy.”
↑ 8. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 12–13. Micha’s case highlights that the barriers to genuine hearing include not only auditory access and cognitive capacity but also the ability to trust.
↑ 9. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 13–14. The Rapunzel case is Beilby’s most controversial, because Rapunzel was not technically unevangelized. She simply ran out of time.
↑ 10. For a careful typology, see Sanders, No Other Name: An Investigation into the Destiny of the Unevangelized (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 12–13; Erickson, “The State of the Question,” in Through No Fault of Their Own?, ed. Crockett and Sigountos (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), 23–24.
↑ 11. Dale Moody, cited in Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 153.
↑ 12. Jonathan, Grace beyond the Grave, pp. 24–25. Jonathan distinguishes hard restrictivism, pessimistic agnosticism, and optimistic agnosticism as subvarieties.
↑ 13. Packer, “Evangelicals and the Way of Salvation,” in Evangelical Affirmations, ed. Kantzer and Henry (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1990), 121–23. Quoted in Jonathan, Grace beyond the Grave, p. 25.
↑ 14. The “two wills” view attempts to resolve this by distinguishing God’s revealed will from his decretive will. But this effectively makes God’s revealed desire dishonest: God tells us he wants something he has already decided not to bring about.
↑ 15. The Arminian reply correctly locates some responsibility in human failure to evangelize. But the unevangelized individual bears no responsibility for the church’s failure. A person who never heard cannot be said to have “freely rejected” a gospel they never encountered.
↑ 16. Sanders presses this point effectively. If infants and the cognitively disabled are saved by an unannounced exception to the requirement of explicit faith, then the requirement is not truly universal. See Sanders, No Other Name, 30–34.
↑ 17. Sanders, No Other Name, as cited in Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, p. 62. Norm Geisler’s extension of this reasoning comes dangerously close to attempting to justify infanticide; see Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, p. 62.
↑ 18. I find this reading of 1 Timothy 2:4 impossible to reconcile with the character of God described in Chapter 2. If God reveals that he desires all to be saved, and simultaneously decrees that most will not be, the revealed desire becomes meaningless.
↑ 19. Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 5, trans. Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), 115–34.
↑ 20. Lumen Gentium 16 (1964).
↑ 21. Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy, 12, 157–58. See also Sanders, No Other Name, 131.
↑ 22. C. S. Lewis, The Last Battle (London: The Bodley Head, 1956), ch. 15. Lewis is careful: Emeth is saved through Aslan, not by Tash.
↑ 23. Hans Küng revised Rahner’s proposal, but the patronizing flavor persisted. See Jonathan, Grace beyond the Grave, pp. 33–35.
↑ 24. Romans 10:14–17. Paul’s logical chain is explicit: sent, preached, heard, believed, called on the Lord.
↑ 25. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 264–65. Beilby grants that faith’s “directional vector” matters, but insists that an implicit openness to God is “supremely irrelevant if it does not result in relationship with God.”
↑ 26. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 62–63. Since salvation is “a chosen, committed relationship with God the Father, Son, and Spirit,” God would desire to give Anna and Sam an opportunity to hear and respond.
↑ 27. This is the decisive objection from the standpoint of this book. Inclusivism provides a category (“saved by implicit faith”) but not a mechanism (an actual encounter with Christ). The Dying Encounter Model provides both.
↑ 28. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 265–67. The engagement-and-wedding analogy is Beilby’s own. The Kunta Kinte and Micha discussions at pp. 266–67 show inclusivism’s inability to handle the pseudoevangelized.
↑ 29. For a survey of Universal Opportunity theories, see Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 90–96, covering Universal Sending (dreams, visions, angels), Preparatio Evangelica (Piper), and the middle-knowledge approach.
↑ 30. See Tom Doyle, Dreams and Visions: Is Jesus Awakening the Muslim World? (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2012). While these accounts are suggestive, their prevalence and verifiability remain debated.
↑ 31. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 95–96. Beilby notes that Universal Sending cannot account for the pseudoevangelized cases at all.
↑ 32. William Lane Craig, “‘No Other Name’: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ,” Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989): 172–88.
↑ 33. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 93–94. The Medal of Honor illustration: “It is far better that a person’s final destination be decided by a decision that they consciously and explicitly make, not by decisions that they would have made.”
↑ 34. Hronich, Once Loved, Always Loved, ch. 1 (“Of God and Men”). Building on Jason Marsh’s proposal, Hronich defines transworld sanctity as the thesis that for at least some persons, there is no feasible world in which they permanently reject God. Note that Hronich explicitly leaves room for the free “yes” to come at the moment of death.
↑ 35. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 134. Manis constructs and critiques Molinist Anti-Universalism (M-AU) at pp. 126–34 and concludes that “anti-universalists are best served to reject Molinism altogether.” Hronich quotes this verdict approvingly.
↑ 36. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 59–60. Beilby argues that the idealization of Anna’s cognitive capacities is “unproblematic,” since we routinely assume the same for the elderly who die with diminished faculties.
↑ 37. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, p. 59.
↑ 38. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 62–63. Beilby frames the encounter as the “spiritual equivalent of the wedding day.” Ronald Nash worried that offering Anna a choice means “large numbers of children will reject the gospel,” but Beilby responds that Nash claims to know far more than any of us can about how an infant would respond to standing before the God who created her.
↑ 39. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 10–11, 65–66.
↑ 40. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 60–61, 65–66.
↑ 41. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 229–30. See the full treatment of the “why do missions?” objection in Chapter 33.
↑ 42. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 11–15, 66–68. Beilby considered several alternative labels (quasievangelized, semievangelized) before settling on pseudoevangelized.
↑ 43. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 66–68, 220. The key distinction: “If the gospel is God’s good news of salvation through Jesus Christ, then what is required is not some bare minimum auditory ‘hearing,’ but a hearing that leads to understanding.”
↑ 44. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, pp. 67–68. Beilby draws on Luke 15 and Matthew 18:6 to argue that God both condemns those who damage another’s ability to trust and desires to overcome the damage they inflict.
↑ 45. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, p. 221.
↑ 46. John 14:6; Acts 4:12. The Dying Encounter Model honors these texts by providing the mechanism through which those who never heard can finally hear.
↑ 47. 1 Timothy 2:4; 2 Peter 3:9; Ezekiel 33:11. See the full treatment of God’s universal salvific will in Chapter 2.
↑ 48. Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God, ch. 2. Talbott argues that a love which is genuinely “inescapable” would not give up on any soul, at death or afterward. The author engages Talbott’s full argument in Chapter 25 and does not endorse his universalist conclusion here.
↑ 49. See Chapter 10 for the NDE evidence on time-dilation, and Chapter 19 for the dynamics of the encounter. The convergence of these lines is developed fully in Chapter 28.
↑ 50. Walls, Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), ch. 4, §II. Walls defines optimal grace as “some measure of grace N which represents the optimal amount of influence toward good which God can exercise on that person’s will without destroying his freedom,” distributed so that “grace of optimal measure is given to all persons.”
↑ 51. Walls, Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 5, “Purgatory and Theories of a ‘Second Chance.’” In the closing paragraphs of the section “When Seconds Matter,” Walls restates the deeply personal character of optimal grace. See the full treatment in Chapter 28.
↑ 52. The encounter’s outcome for Mei is not predetermined. Free will is real at the moment of death as in life. The encounter guarantees a universal offer, not universal acceptance. For the eschatological possibilities (ECT, CI, UR), see Chapter 29.